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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
STEVEN E. STRAHM 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 960414-CA 
PRIORITY 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp 1995) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Appellant's Sixth Amendment rights under the 
United States Constitution were violated by failure of the Court to 
appoint new counsel after Appelleant fired his second attorney or 
its failure toinquire into the conflict between defense counsel and 
the Defendant. 
2. Whether the Applellant's counsel ineffectively 
represented Appellant by failing to inform Appellant of a possible 
enhancement prior to trial. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUATORY PROVISIONS 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Rights of Accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a jury verdict of guilty to aggravated assault, 
a third degree felony, entered in the Third District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah on February 2, 1996. Defendant 
was sentenced to 0-5 years plus enhanced term, a $2,000.00 fine, 
and an 85% surcharge. R.141-142. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The Petitioner/Appellant (hereinafter, "Defendant") was 
arrested for Aggravated Assault on September 1, 1994. 
2. On the eve of trial to be held December 12 and 13, 1995, 
the main witness changed his story in connection with the 
Defendant, recanting his story as to what actually occurred the 
night of the assault. 
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3. Because of this change of story from the witness, the 
first attorney was disqualified as counsel and a new defense 
attorney was assigned. 
4. One day before the trial or December 11, 1995, Defendant 
fired the second attorney because of difference of opinion in how 
the case was proceeding and the witnesses that should be contacted. 
5. The second attorney notified the judge that the Defendant 
had fired him as his counsel and that he would not be able to 
adequately represent the Defendant. R.77-78. 
6. The judge did not allow a replacement of counsel for the 
Defendant and Defendant was found guilty at trial of Assault and 
sentenced to 0-5 years plus an enhancement for use of a firearm--
the enhancement to run consecutively. R.141-142. 
7. Defendant's second counsel also failed to instruct 
Defendant regarding the possibility of the enhancement. 
8. There is a short record made in this case at a hearing 
before Timothy R. Hansen on December 11, 1996, with a different 
Court Reporter present than the Court Reporter present at Trial 
December 12 and 13, 1996. This portion of the record is pertinent 
to the issue now before the appellate court. R. 77-78, See also 
Addendum. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Appellant's Sixth Amendment Rights were violated when the 
court failed to appoint new counsel after Appellant fired his 
second atorney and because the court failed to inquire as to the 
3 
nature of the conflict. Moreover, defense counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to instrct the appellant of the possibility of an 
enhancement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights under 
the United States Constitution were violated by 
failure of the court to appoint new counsel after 
the Defendant fired his second attorney or its 
failure to inquire into the conflict between 
defense counsel and the Defendant. 
The Defendant was arrested for Aggravated Assault on September 
1, 1994. On the eve of trial to be held December 12 and 13, 1995, 
the main witness against the Defendant recanted his story in 
connection with the Defendant's alleged assault, stating to the 
original defense that he had lied previously as to the facts of the 
case and that he was changing his story as to what purportedly 
occurred in the assault. 
Because of this new information from the witness, the first 
defense counsel was disqualified as counsel and a new attorney was 
assigned. Before the trial, the Defendant fired the second 
attorney because of difference of opinion in how the case was 
proceeding and the witnesses that should be subpoenaed. On May 11, 
1996, the day before trial, the second defense attorney notified 
the judge that the Defendant had fired him as his counsel and that 
he would not be able to adequately and zealously represent the 
Defendant. R.77-78, See also Addendum A. 
The District Court Judge did not allow a replacement for the 
Defendant and Defendant was found guilty at trial and sentenced to 
0-5 years plus the firearm enhancement to run consecutively. 
Although in the second appointment of defense counsel there is 
not a clear conflict of interest on the part of the attorney and 
client that is placed on the court record, there is clearly an 
awareness by the second defense counsel that he could not 
adequately represent the defendant after he had been fired. R.77-
78, See also Addendum A pages 4-5. 
In this type of situation where the trial court does not 
appoint new counsel after a request by defense counsel has been 
made, it seems imperative that the trial court at least 
sufficiently ascertain the risk of conflict between the client and 
his attorney at a separate hearing and determine the remoteness or 
specific prejudice--which in this case was not performed. See 
HQlloway vt Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
Since no inquiry was made as to the conflict in this case by 
the trial court, the case should be remanded or overturned for 
the Defendant's violation of his Sixth Amendment rights under the 
United States Constitution. 
II. Defense counsel ineffectively represented 
Defendant by failing to inform Defendant of a 
possible enhancement prior to trial. 
The test determinative in this matter of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is found in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
5 
U.S. 668, 1984. In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court has 
given reviewing courts a two pronged test in determining 
ineffectiveness of counsel claims. First, the defendant must show 
that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing 
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Secondly, the Defendant must 
show that the performance prejudiced the defense. The requires 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
Defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
In this case, defense counsel failed to inform the Defendant 
of a possible firearm enhancement. Defendant had purportedly used 
a gun in the commission of the charged assault. In fact, the 
Defendant did not learn of the firearm enhancement until after the 
trial and was sentenced with an enhancement. R.141-142. Clearly, 
defense counsel was deficient in not informing the Defendant of the 
enhancement. Defendant, if the enhancement had been made known to 
him along with its potential for a longer prison sentence, could 
have considered the prosecutors plea bargain more seriously. 
Instead the Defendant decided to proceed to trial without knowing 
the ramifications of a conviction. Moreover, the conduct on the 
part of defense counsel was unreasonable because "minimal research" 
would have alerted defense counsel to the correct status of 
Defendant's potential firearm enhancement. See, Garmon v. 
Lockhart. 938 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1991). 
After noting that ""[c]ounsel is strongly presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in 
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the exercise of reasonable professional judgment'' U.S. v. Cook, 45 
F.3d 388, 394 (10th Cir. 1995) (Quoting D^v^r v. Kansas St.af.P 
Penitentiary. 36 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1994)), the tenth 
circuit then concluded that some decisions (i.e., failure to press 
a ""deadbang winner'' on appeal in Cook) are not deserving of such 
a presumption. Surely failure to do ""minimal research1' of 
firearm enhancements is such an undeserving decision. 
The Supreme Court in Lozada v. Deeds. 498 U.S. 430 (1991) 
cited Strickland in holding that failure to inform defendant of the 
right to appeal resulting in a loss of that right meets the 
ineffectiveness prong of Strickland and presumes the prejudice 
prong. Id.,at 432. Similarly, a failure to inform a defendant of 
what he would be pleading to violates the defendant's right to 
understand the charges against him and should presume prejudice. 
Defendant, if the enhancement had been made known to him along with 
its potential for a longer prison sentence, could have considered 
the prosecutors plea bargain more seriously. Instead, the 
defendant decided to proceed to trial without knowing the 
ramifications of a conviction. This closely mirrors the situation 
facing the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Blaylock. 20 F.3d 1458 (9th 
Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit held that failure to communicate a 
plea offer is ineffective counsel and where ineffective counsel 
deprives the defendant of the opportunity to accept the offer, the 
remedy is to reinstate the offer. Id., at 1468. The Ninth Circuit 
""emphasized that although Blaylock had received a fair trial, he 
is not precluded from showing prejudice.'' Id., at 1466. They 
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also cited the Third Circuit in U.S. v. Day. 969 F.2nd 39 (3rd Cir. 
1992). Where the ""Third Circuit "squarely rejected' the argument 
that a defendant can suffer no prejudice by standing a fair 
trial.11 Id., at 1466 (quoting Day at 44). Moreover, the conduct 
on the part of defense counsel was unreasonable because ""minimal 
research1' would have alerted defense counsel to the correct status 
of defendant's potential firearm enhancement. See Garmom v. 
Lockhart.93 8 F.2nd 120 (8th Cir. 1991). 
Under the prejudice prong of Strickland, this case illustrates 
the effect of the ""evil'! feared by the Holloway Court. Referring 
to a conflict of interest case, the Court identified the evil as 
""what the advocate... refrains from doing, not only at trial but 
also as to the possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the 
sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to identify 
from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure 
to undertake certain trial tasks but even with a record...available 
it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of...the 
attorney's representation of a client.11 Holloway at 490-91. 
Although Holloway referred to a conflict of interest problem, the 
""evil'' is no less real when due to a lack of effective counsel. 
These two types are described by Justice Marshall as ""different in 
Kind'1 Orders, 494 U.S. 1039, 1045 (199u). The major difference 
being that the ""presumption that counsel's conduct was the result 
of strategic decisions'' is present in effective counsel claims. 
Id. This decision has no strategy justification. See, U.S. v. 
Cook. 45 F.3rd 388, 394 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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Under these circumstances, a competent attorney would have 
warned the Defendant of the risk of proceeding to trial because of 
a strong potential for an enhancement. A lawyer who so fails to 
advise his client cannot be said to have been functioning as 
counsel within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Risher v. 
United States. 992 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Defendant/Appellant respectfully 
request that the Utah Court of Appeals vacate the Judgment and 
Sentence below and remand for a new trial. 
Dated this 5th day of November, 1996. J^ f 
T065kD. GARDNER 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be delivered a 
true and correct cogy^of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the 
following, on this A /— day of /Co, ^xA*'^ , 19 . 
Howard Lemke 
District Attorney-Salt Lake 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, 84111 
Barnard N. Madsen 
Jan Graham 
Attorney Generals Office 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fir. 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
10 
ADDENDUM A 
COURT TRANSCRIPT OF DECEMBER 11, 1995 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
STEVEN STRAHM, ] 
Defendant. 
I Case No. 960130 
| 951900437 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Proceedings before the Honorable 
TIMOTHY R. HANSEN 
on December 11, 1995 
CATHY GALLEGOS 
CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER 
2901 W. Bedford Road 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Steven Strahm 
3 951900347. Appearances, please. 
4 MR. LEMCKE: Howard Lemcke for the State. 
5 State is here and prepared to proceed. 
6 MR. ANDERSON: Patrick Anderson for Mr. 
7 Strahm, Your Honor. As I have indicated to the court, we 
8 need to address, I guess, a joint motion. Defendant has 
9 asked for a new attorney. I would make a motion to 
10 withdraw as counsel for Mr. Strahm. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Strahm, why do you want 
12 another lawyer? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I have asked my 
14 attorney a couple simple things before this trial today. 
15 I asked him if he could call the jail, make sure I would 
16 be able to get a haircut, use a pair of scissors to trim 
17 my mustache, look presentable in front of the court. I 
18 also asked him if he could bring some clothes since I have 
19 not been granted bail that I could reach to get on the 
20 outside to take care of these things on my own, and I 
21 never did receive the chance to try these clothes on until 
22 this morning. When they are brought up, the clothes they 
23 brought me did not fit, the clothes they brought again 
24 didn't fit, and then I was asked to wear the clothes that 
25 I was arrested in in this courtroom, which were wrinkled. 
1 The shirt was wrinkled. I feel like if I am going to a 
2 jury trial, I should at least look presentable. And I 
3 feel like either Mr. Anderson is too busy or something 
4 else is going on. I don't want to put the blame anywhere, 
5 but I felt like someone should have brought the clothes to 
6 where I could have tried them on before the trial. I also 
7 felt like I should have been able to have a haircut and 
8 use a pair of scissors instead of having to use a razor in 
9 a jail cell to get ready for a trial. Alsof there's been 
10 a few other things I have asked him to do on the outside 
11 to contact the bank, to make arrangements to where I could 
12 get money on my books and that's never been done. Mr. 
13 Anderson was good enough to take twenty dollars out of his 
14 pocket and put it on my books, which I appreciate. I told 
15 him I would pay him back, but I also feel the attorney 
16 that I have that I want to represent me on this I want it 
17 to be the same attorney that represents me on these other 
18 charges. 
19 THE COURT: Who represents you on the witness 
20 tampering? 
21 MR. ANDERSON: On the witness tampering 
22 charges because of the trial, the capital homicide I had, 
23 I was unable to try that case. So it was going to have to 
24 be a different attorney. I did the preliminary hearing in 
25 that case I was unable to represent him. 
1 THE COURT: No one has been assigned? 
2 MR. ANDERSON: Candace Johnson, someone in my 
3 office. Mr. Strahm indicates he wants another attorney. 
4 It will go to a different team on the conflict contract, 
5 Your Honor. 
6 THE DEFENDANT: There was one other reason, I 
7 was told Mr. Anderson and Mr. Moffat would have visited me 
8 at the jail to discuss this case. Now that Mr. Moffat is 
9 a witness for myself, Mr. Anderson was the only one that 
10 showed up. I don't see how I can get effective counsel if 
11 the witness who or my attorney who is now a witness and 
12 now my present attorney and I can't all sit down and 
13 discuss the case. Mr. Anderson didn't even know that I 
14 had a day planner that had all my notes in it of all the 
15 discrepancies from the preliminary hearing until two or 
16 three days ago. I just feel like I am not satisfied with 
17 that. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, anything else you 
19 would state for the record that allow me to delay this 
20 trial to change counsel? 
21 MR. ANDERSON: I believe it would be in Mr. 
22 Strahm's best interest to allow him to fire me or to allow 
23 me to withdraw. I feel due to some things that Mr. Strahm 
24 like if the trial went forth today, I would not 
25 effectively represent him, and it would be in his best 
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interests and interest of justice to allow him to 
withdraw. 
THE COURT: Are you telling me as an officer 
of the court, the unspecified relationship I don't expect 
it to be discussed. You don't believe you could be 
effective counsel? 
MR. ANDERSON: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Anything from the State? 
MR. LEMCKE: Except, Your Honor, that you 
know we have been here. We have had our witnesses now on 
a couple different occasions. It's difficult for them, we 
would expect that this would be, if nothing else, a waiver 
of speedy trial rights through actions of the defendant, 
he would not be allowed to complain about that. We would 
ask that although we note since he doesn't have a new 
attorney today, we could not schedule a trial today. 
Would I be allowed some latitude in contacting my 
witnesses, if we need time when that is reset? 
THE COURT: Mr. Strahm, you understand if 
your attorney withdraws today pursuant to this request, 
this trial will not go forward today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do. I 
would hope it wouldn't take too much longer than a 
reasonable amount of time to reschedule it. I feel like I 
25 shouldn't be punished any more than I already have by a 
1 hundred thousand dollars bail that we could be able to 
2 reschedule this and get to go on in a reasonable amount of 
3 time. 
4 THE COURT: Earliest I can do it is February 
5 12. 
6 THE DEFENDANT: I believe the other trial was 
7 scheduled for— 
8 MR. ANDERSON: 16th of January. 
9 THE DEFENDANT: 16th of January. 
10 THE COURT: I don't care what the other trial 
11 was set for. I am telling you the first available date I 
12 havef I don't have the matters that have precedent over 
13 that February 12, if you will waive your rights to a 
14 speedy trial? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Does that mean I have to stay 
16 in jail until February 12? 
17 THE COURT: In all likelihood, otherwise, you 
18 wouldn't have a speedy trial— you don't get it both ways. 
19 Mr. Strahm, this case has been continued numerous times 
20 usually for reasons that it's not the responsibility of 
21 the State if you want me to continue it again, so I can 
22 consider getting you another attorney, that's the best I 
23 can do for you. And if that's not acceptable, then let's 
24 try the case. 
25 THE DEFENDANT: What date would that be? 
1 THE COURT: February 12. 
2 THE DEFENDANT: What if I decided to keep Mr. 
3 Anderson as my attorney? 
4 THE COURT: Or I can get you some other 
5 clothes. 
6 THE DEFENDANT: Let's go on with it then, 
7 Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Okay let's do it. All right. I 
9 think what I will do is this I think I will have the jury 
10 come back in the morning. I don't want to keep them 
11 waiting any longer. Nine-thirty in the morning work? 
12 MR. LEMCKE: A couple things. First of all, 
13 defendant stated the clothes he had before were wrinkled. 
14 Would the court ask him if in fact they were pressed or 
15 laundered if they would be acceptable clothes? 
16 THE COURT: If they aren't, they wouldn't be 
17 acceptable, let's put it that way. Mr. Anderson, I guess 
18 you can't withdraw. Your client won't waive his speedy 
19 trial rights. I wouldn't require him to do that. You are 
20 prepared. I guess you will have to do the best you can, 
21 start tomorrow at nine-thirty and, Mr. Lemcke, I need your 
22 assistance with regard to the jail to see that his 
23 clothing is laundered so that— 
24 MR. LEMCKE: I will do what I can, if counsel 
25 can help me locate where they are at the moment. 
8 
THE COURT: I want somebody to tell the jail 
to do that, 
MR. LEMCKE: We will do it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, this case will go 
tomorrow at nine-thirty tomorrow morning. This will go 
regardless. I will see you then. 
****•**• 
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THE STATE OF UTAH ] 
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